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NOTES
Use of Surveillance Evidence Under Title III:
Bridging the Legislative Gap Between
the Language and Purpose of the
Sealing Requirement
I. INTRODUCTION
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of
19681 establishes a statutory scheme designed to regulate the use of
nonconsensual electronic surveillance.2 The Act subjects any person
who obtains or uses wiretap evidence in violation of its provisions to
both criminal punishment8 and civil sanctions. 4 The statute enumer-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
2. Nonconsensual electronic surveillance encompasses both wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping. Wiretapping results from the installation of a particular piece of equipment
that intercepts telephone, telegraph, or other wire communications. Electronic eavesdropping,
or "bugging," is the interception of orally transmitted communications. In either situation, the
interception is without the consent or knowledge of the participants to the conversation. Re-
cording the conversation with the consent of one of the participants does not require judicial
authorization. See United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); United States v.
Head, 586 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1978). Such consent renders the interception lawful. 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(c) (1976).
3. Section 2511 of Title III provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter any person who-
(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to in-
tercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication;
(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor
to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communica-
tion... ;
(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of
any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the informa-
tion was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in viola-
tion of this subsection; or
(d) willfully uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire or oral communica-
tion, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through
the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
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ates the conditions and limits the circumstances under which law en-
forcement officials may petition a judge to issue a wiretap order.5
Furthermore, the government in executing the surveillance must
comply with specific statutory guidelines before the contents of the
intercepted communications are admissible in a judicial proceeding.6
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976).
4. Section 2520 of Title III provides in pertinent part:
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in viola-
tion of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts,
discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept, disclose or use such communi-
cation, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of
$100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
5. Subject to specified limitations, Title III permits court-ordered electronic surveillance
and prohibits all wiretapping and eavesdropping by anyone other than law enforcement person-
nel. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 488, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2156 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIV E HISTORY].
6. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). The decisions in Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), provide a constitutional
framework that controls the use of electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies. See
infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text. In enacting Title III, Congress endeavored to estab-
lish a detailed statutory procedure for electronic surveillance consistent with the standards set
forth in Berger and Katz. Section 2516(1) of Title III permits a judge to authorize electronic
surveillance for the investigation of the following federal offenses: Murder, kidnapping, rob-
bery, extortion, bribery, transmission of wagering information, obstruction of justice, various
racketeering offenses, violations of narcotics laws, and conspiracy to commit any of these enu-
merated offenses. The attorney general or assistant attorney general must authorize the appli-
cation to the judge. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The applicant must present
evidence constituting probable cause to believe that an offense to which Title III applies "has
been, is being, or is about to be committed." Id. § 2518(1)(b). The applicant also must submit a
detailed description of the particular offense under investigation, the nature and location of the
facilities the government will place under surveillance, the type of communications sought, and
the identity, if known, of the person whose conversations the government will intercept. Id. A
law enforcement official applying for a surveillance order must specify the period of time during
which the interception will take place. If the surveillance will not terminate upon the initial
interception of the targeted communication, the officer must set forth facts that establish prob-
able cause to believe that the targeted communications repeatedly will occur. Id. § 2518(1)(d).
The applicant must show that the government attempted other investigative procedures and
failed, and why the government likely would not succeed using alternative procedures or that
these alternatives would be too dangerous to employ. Id. § 2518(1)(c). Title III further provides
that no court may authorize the interception of communications for any period longer than
necessary to accomplish the objective, nor in any event longer than thirty days. Id. § 2518(5).
Finally, every order or extension must contain a directive that the government minimize the
interception of communications otherwise not subject to interception. Id. Congress and the
drafters of the statute believed that the provisions of Title III sufficiently circumscribe lawful
electronic surveillance to bring it within the scope of the fourth amendment. LEGSLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 5, at 2153.
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Congress enacted a sweeping exclusionary rule7 in Title III to compel
governmental compliance with these preinterception and executional
requirements. Title III also requires the twenty-eight jurisdictions
that have statutes authorizing electronic surveillance9 to comply with
its minimum standards.
10
In passing Title III, Congress set four goals: First, to restrain un-
fettered use of wiretapping and to safeguard the privacy of wire and
oral communications, particularly those of innocent persons;1 sec-
ond, to facilitate law enforcement officials' battle against crime, espe-
cially against organized crime;12 third, to comply with the constitu-
7. See infra notes 83-106 and accompanying text.
8. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3004 to -3014 (1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 16-15-101 to -105 (1973 & Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-41a to -41s (West
Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to -556 (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01-.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-60 to -69
(1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 803-41 to -50 (Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to -6709
(Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2519 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1301-:1312
(West 1981); MD. CTS. JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -412 (1980 & Supp. 1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01-.23 (West Supp. 1982);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to -712 (1976 & Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 179.410-.525 (1979
& 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1-:11 (1974 & Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:156A-1 to -26 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-1 to -11 (1978 &
Supp. 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 133.721-.739 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Purdon 1982-1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-5.1-1 to -16 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-35A-1 to -21 (Supp.
1982); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to -
11 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983), § 885.365 (West 1966
& Supp. 1982-1983) (suppression provision).
9. Indeed, several states have enacted restrictions more stringent than those under Title
III. See, e.g., People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 271, 522 P.2d 1049, 1057, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241,
249, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1064 (1974); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833
(Mass. 1975); State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972).
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV declares that all laws made pursuant to the Constitution and all
treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the "supreme law of the land"
and shall enjoy legal superiority over any conflicting provision of a state constitution or law.
Therefore, any state regulatory scheme that seeks to authorize electronic surveillance at a mini-
mum must comport with Title III guidelines, standards, and restrictions.
11. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2153.
12. Most law enforcement officials view electronic surveillance as an indispensable tool in
the investigation and prosecution of organized criminals. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, AN-
NOTATIONS AND CONSULTANT'S PAPERS 17 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
Congress designed Title III to accomplish two seemingly adverse objectives: guaranteeing an
individual's constititional right to privacy and preserving a valuable investigatory tool for law
enforcement officials. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RE-
LATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 3, 4, 33
(1976) [hereinafted cited as NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMM'N REP.]; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra, at 17-19; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2156.
The paramount purpose of Title III is to eradicate organized crime in the United States by
supplying law enforcement officials with technologically superior legal tools for use in gathering
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tional procedural and substantive requirements articulated by the
Supreme Court in Berger v. New York' s and Katz v. United States;"
and last, to outline specific circumstances and conditions for lawful
interception of wire and oral communications.
15
Section 2518(8)(a) of Title III1 delineates the sealing require-
ment, which provides that the government present to a judge17 all
tape recordings of intercepted communications "[i]mmediately upon
the expiration of the period of the order"' 8 and seal them "under his
evidence, establishing new penal prohibitions, enhancing sanctions, and providing new remedies
to deal with the activities of organized criminals. LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 5, at 2157,
2177-97.
13. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz Court reaffirmed the constitutional principles outlined
by Berger. The Berger Court outlined seven requirements for the issuance of a valid eavesdrop-
ping warrant: (1) probable cause must exist to believe that a particular offense has been or is
being committed; (2) the warrant must describe particularly the targeted conversation; (3) the
government must limit the duration of the eavesdropping; (4) a court may grant extensions
only on a showing of probable cause; (5) eavesdropping must terminate once the government
has obtained the evidence it sought; (6) notice must exist unless the government shows exigent
circumstances; and (7) the government must make a return on the warrant. Id. at 352.
15. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2177-96.
16. Section 2518(8)(a) provides:
The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by
this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The
recording of the contents of any wire or oral communication under this subsection shall
be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Im-
mediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such re-
cordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his
directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall not be
destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any event shall be
kept for ten years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the
provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 2517 of this chapter for investigations. The
presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the
absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any
wire or oral communicaton or evidence derived therefrom under subsection (3) of section
2517.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
17. In United States v. Cantor, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972), the court addressed the issue
of the meaning of "sealed by the judge." In Cantor the judge instructed the government agent
to seal the documents in an envelope and store it away. The judge, however, did not observe
the agent seal the envelope because he had left his chambers prior to the actual sealing. The
Third Circuit held that no violation of the statute occurred because defendant failed to chal-
lenge the accuracy of the tapes and because he did not allege alteration of the documents. The
court implied that the judge, rather than the agent, should seal the documents, yet the court
stated that the tapes would not be necessarily more confidential if the judge himself had sealed
the documents. Id. at 893.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976). See United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1275-78
(2d Cir. 1979) (only the termination of continuous surveillance activates the Title III sealing
duty, although many similar state laws impose the sealing requirement at the expiration of each
order or extension); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 532-33 (2d Cir. 1977) (back-to-back
extensions continued the same wiretap on the same telephone under the same warrant, and
1983] SURVEILLANCE EVIDENCE
directions."' 9 If the tapes have no seal, the government must provide
"a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof."'20 By implication,
the sealing provision requires a "satisfactory explanation" if a judi-
cial seal is present but the government did not immediately obtain
the seal.2 ' The government also must seal the applications for wire-
tap orders and the orders themselves.2
If law enforcement officials do not comply with the sealing re-
quirement, section 2517(3)23 of Title III prohibits the disclosure or
Title III, therefore, only requires the government to seal the tapes after the termination of the
extensions to the original order).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976). In United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir.
1979), the court considered that tapes sealed by a judge other than the issuing judge were
sealed properly if the latter is absent or unavailable. Id. at 1280 n.25. In United States v. Abra-
ham, 541 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1976), the court explained that § 2518(8)(a) does not compel the
presence of the judge during the physical sealing of the recorded evidence. Sealing of the re-
cordings only must be pursuant to the judge's direction; sealing does not require his presence.
Id. at 627.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976).
21. Id. Although § 2518 of Title III prohibits interception of wire or oral communication
for more than thirty days, § 2518(5) allows judges to grant extensions until the government
achieves the objective of the surveillance order. Courts measure sealing delays from the date
interception ends, notwithstanding the number or length of judicially granted extensions. See,
e.g., United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979).
Issues associated with the "immediacy" of the sealing are beyond the scope of this Note.
Courts would create an incongruous result by requiring an immediate sealing when the surveil-
lance ends on the last day of the 30-day order, yet permitting postponement of sealing until the
end of the 30-day period when, for instance, the surveillance itself terminates on the second or
third day of the order. United States v. Ricco, 421 F. Supp. 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 566
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1977). Accordingly, the length of the surveillance order does not affect the
triggering of the sealing requirement. The length of a judicial order merely limits the period
that a wiretap may remain installed. For example, the government achieves its objective stated
in the application for a wiretap order when it intercepts the incriminating conversations it
seeks. If the government either fails to procure a prospective amendment to the wiretap order
that would authorize further interception of inculpatory conversations relating to a new crime
or fails to obtain an extension, then under § 2518(5) the wiretap must cease. If the government
completes the wiretap before the order's 30-day limit expires, the statute nonetheless requires
immediate sealing of the evidence notwithstanding the unexpired time remaining in the wiretap
order. Because the judge formulated his order based upon the time he believed the government
would require to achieve its stated objective, courts should not permit any remaining time to
delay sealing merely because the government achieved the objective of the wiretap earlier than
the judge initially surmised.
22. Section 2518(8)(b) provides:
Applications made and orders granted under this chapter shall be sealed by the judge.
Custody of the applications and orders shall be wherever the judge directs. Such applica-
tions and orders shall be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a judge of
competent jurisdiction and shall not be destroyed except on order of the issuing or deny-
ing judge, and in any event shall be kept for ten years.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b) (1976). The purpose of this provision is to preserve the confidentiality of
an individual's communications that law enforcement authorities have intercepted. See United
States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
23. Section 2517(3) provides:
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other use of the contents of intercepted communications, or any evi-
dence derived therefrom, 2 4 in judicial proceedings.25 Failure to com-
ply with the sealing requirement, therefore, may invalidate post facto
an otherwise lawful electronic surveillance. Furthermore, a failure to
comply with many other provisions of Title III may result in any of
the following measures: Suppression of the evidence obtained, 26 pen-
alties for contempt of court,27 civil damages, 28 or criminal sanctions.2 '
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any informa-
tion concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom intercepted
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the contents of that com-
munication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in
any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political
subdivision thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1976).
24. For example, in United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd, 553
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977), the government used evidence contained in defectively sealed tapes
made by state authorities to establish probable cause for a subsequent federal wiretap order.
The court noted that without a satisfactory explanation for the delay in sealing the state tapes,
§ 2518(8)(a) probably would suppress the federal tapes derived from evidence contained in the
tainted state tapes. The Caruso court, however, found the government's explanation for the
sealing delay in this case satisfactory under § 2518(8)(a). See 415 F. Supp. at 850.
25. "Use" or "disclosure" prohibited by § 2518(8)(a) refers only to disclosure under sub-
section 3 of § 2517. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1976); supra note 23. Section 2517(3) states in
pertinent part that the "disclosure" to which it applies occurs in the "giving [of] testimony
under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or
any state or subdivision thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1976). Section 2518(8)(a) does not, by its
terms, apply to nontestimonial uses. See id. § 2518(8)(a).
For example, refreshing a witness' recollection before trial falls not within § 2517(3) but
rather within § 2517(2)-use by an investigator or law enforcement officer "to the extent such
use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties." Id. § 2517(2). In Ricco the
U.S. Attorney used the tapes to refresh the recollecton of a witness before trial. See United
States v. Ricco, 421 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 566 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1977). "Use"
permitted by § 2517(2) therefore is not subject to the strictures of § 2518(8)(a). Only after the
trial begins does refreshing a witness' recollection fall within the scope of § 2517(3) and thus
within the prohibition of § 2518(8)(a).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976). Motions challenging violations of Title III's provi-
sions may lead to exclusion of the eavesdropping evidence, People v. Nicoletti, 34 N.Y.2d 249,
251-52, 313 N.E.2d 335, 335-36, 356 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856-57 (1974), instead of outright suppres-
sion. This sanction would be less debilitating than suppression because derivative evidence nur-
tured during and developed from the electronic surveillance would be competent, admissible
evidence. A court would prohibit absolutely testimonial reference to the substance of the inter-
cepted communications or to the recordings themselves. One court held that complete suppres-
sion because of a missing seal is an inappropriate sanction. United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d
478, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975). But cf. United States v. Lucido,
517 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975). One court has deemed suppression appropriate when the govern-
ment broke affixed seals to the tape recordings without first seeking and obtaining judicial
approval. People v. Sher, 38 N.Y.2d 600, 605, 345 N.E.2d 314, 317, 381 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846
(1976).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(c) (1976) (violation of the sealing requirement punishable as con-
tempt of court).
28. Id. § 2520 (actual and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and reasonable costs availa-
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The primary purpose underlying the sealing requirement is to
guarantee the integrity of taped conversations made under a Title III
wiretap order by precluding any governmental tampering or altera-
tion with those tapes.30 The proponents of Title III presumed that
the requisite judicial seal sufficiently would safeguard the purpose of
the sealing requirement.3 1 Two aspects of the statutory language,
however, create problems of interpretation for the courts. First, sec-
tion 2518(8) (a) fails to describe specifically the requirement of sealing
the tapes and documents "[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the
period of the order, or extension thereof. . . .,, Second, the statu-
tory language provides no guidelines for a "satisfactory explana-
tion"33 sufficient to overcome a failure to procure a seal immediately
upon expiration of the wiretap order.3 4 This Note examines the disa-
ble to aggrieved persons as a result of Title III violations).
29. Id. § 2511(1) (prohibited electronic surveillance punishable by a fine not to exceed
$10,000, imprisonment for not more than five years, or both). See United States v. Duncan, 598
F.2d 839, 846-47 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979) (bank president fined and impris-
oned for conducting illegal electronic surveillance of Internal Revenue Service agents during
their audit of the bank and the president-defendant).
30. United States v. Ricco, 421 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 566 F.2d 433 (2d
Cir. 1977). The sealing requirement also serves two other purposes: (1) to ensure that the con-
tents of the tapes remain confidential and (2) to help establish the chain of custody. United
States v. Cantor, 470 F.2d 890, 893 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1053,
1058 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); People v.
Nicoletti, 34 N.Y.2d 249, 253, 313 N.E.2d 336, 338, 356 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858 (1974).
31. See LEGISLATIvE HIsToRY, supra note 5, at 2193-94.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976); see supra note 16. The court in People v. Carter, 81
Misc. 2d 345, 348-49, 365 N.Y.S.2d 964, 968 (Nassau County Ct. 1975), construed the statutory
mandate requiring "immediate" sealing to mean "without unnecessary or unreasonable delay"
as opposed to no delay whatsoever. See United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979)
(sealing usually possible within one or two days after the completion of the interception; conse-
quently, any delay exceeding two days requires explanation); People v. Blanda, 80 Misc. 2d 79,
83, 362 N.Y.S.2d 735, 743 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (statutory term "immediately" denoted delivery of
the recordings to the court "promptly, within a reasonable time, or with reasonable diligence");
infra notes 111 & 118.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976); see supra note 16; infra note 120.
34. See People v. Nicoletti, 34 N.Y.2d 249, 313 N.E.2d 336, 356 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1974), in
which the government never presented the tapes to a judge for sealing, but a police detective
stored the tapes in his home. Monitoring agents and the district attorney made duplicate re-
cordings and transcripts of the originally taped conversation. Once informed of the storage ar-
rangement for the tapes, the judge suppressed the contents of the taped conversations notwith-
standing government arguments that government agents substantially had followed New York's
sealing statute, that transcription of the tapes was necessary, and that no sufficiently secure
storage facilities were available. The court ruled that the government seriously had abridged
the statute and stated:
Measured against the potential for abuse, the explanations offered in this case are patently
insufficient. While the parties charged with custody of the tape recordings were cognizant
of the sealing requirement, they did not present them to the issuing Justice for sealing as
was their duty. That the issuing Justice was advised of the custody arrangements will not
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greement among the federal courts of appeals regarding these two as-
pects of Title III's language, especially as these aspects affect the
courts' determination of (1) whether violation of the sealing require-
ment is serious enough to require suppression of the tapes and (2)
the appropriateness of suppressing improperly sealed tapes even
without evidence of alteration. 5 Part II demonstrates the courts'
confusion regarding the "immediately" and "satisfactory explana-
tion" requirements of section 2518(8)(a). This demonstration further
illustrates the differing approaches among the circuits concerning the
analytical procedure best suited to effect suppression of improperly
sealed evidence under the statute. Part III focuses on the five meth-
ods of analysis used by the courts in considering violations of the
sealing requirement and possible suppression of the tapes. Part IV
evaluates the various analyses and concludes that a satisfactory ex-
planation and uncontroverted evidence that the government fulfilled
the purpose underlying the sealing requirement should prevent the
exclusion of wiretapping evidence, even though the government has
not met the sealing requirement. Last, this Note advocates that
courts assign to the government the burden of proving that it has not
compromised the integrity of the tapes.
II. STATUTORY SCHEME AND THE SEALING REQUIREMENT
A. Electronic Surveillance and the Supreme Court
1. Abandonment of the Trespass Doctrine
In 1928 the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States36 first
considered the constitutional implications of electronic surveillance.
The Olmstead Court declared that fourth amendment37 restraints are
suffice. While he may have tactily approved them, the fact remains that the recordings
were not sealed .... [D]uplicate recordings could and should have been made and the
originals preserved under seal.
Id. at 253 (footnote omitted).
35. Compare United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1979) (suppres-
sion would have ensued notwithstanding the absence of a showing of tampering with the tapes
when the government failed to offer an adequate explanation for a seven- and thirteen-day
delay in sealing) with United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (despite a 14-day delay in sealing, court did not order suppression since
defendants failed to demonstrate any disturbance or alteration of the tapes and failed to show
that they sustained any prejudice from the delay) and United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557,
564 (7th Cir. 1975) (notwithstanding a 57-day delay in sealing, court refused to order suppres-
sion because defendants failed to challenge the integrity of the tapes).
36. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
37. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
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inapplicable to government wiretapping operations 8 because such
surveillance does not entail physical trespass or seizure of tangible
evidence. 9 In his historic dissent Justice Brandeis rebuked the ma-
jority for their rigid interpretation of the fourth amendment in the
context of electronic surveillance." The Supreme Court's later deci-
sions, however, gradually abandoned rigid notions of "search and
seizure" and ultimately rejected Olmstead's holding that fourth
amendment protections apply only to physical trespasses.
In Silverman v. United States41 the Court excluded conversa-
tional evidence derived from a "spike mike,' 42 which the government
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
38. 277 U.S. at 455-57, 463-66. Defendant bootleggers argued that the government's use of
defendant's incriminating conversations, intercepted during a five-month warrantless wiretap of
eight telephones, represented an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
Id. at 455-57.
39. Id. at 464-66. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the government
placed a listening device (detectaphone) on the outside of a party wall. The Supreme Court
followed the Olmstead precedent and upheld the use of electronic surveillance evidence because
no physical trespass resulted from placing a detectaphone on the outide of a wall. Id. at 134-36;
see J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE §§ 1.02-1.02[2] (1977); C. FISHMAN, WIRE-
TAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING 6-9 (1978). See also Goldsmith, The Codification of Electronic
Surveillance: Executing Constitutional Doctrine and Legislative Design, 74 J. CraLM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 1, - (1983) (forthcoming) ("There is something anomalous about a constitu-
tional doctrine that offers substantial protection to tangible items but does nothing to secure
the privacy of thoughts disclosed in confidence.").
40. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 472. In his dissent Justice Brandeis stated:
Since then [1819], this Court has repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress,
under various clauses of that instrument [the Constitution], over objects of which the Fa-
thers could not have dreamed. . . .We have likewise held that general limitations on the
powers of Government, like those embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, do not forbid the United States or the States from meeting
modern conditions by regulations which "a century ago, or even half a century ago, proba-
bly would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.". . . Clauses guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of ad-
aptation to a changing world. It was with reference to such a clause that this court said in
Weems v. United States. . . "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it
is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be nec-
essarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings
into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth .. .
Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted).
41. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
42. A "spike mike" is a microphone with a foot-long spike, earphones, a power pack, and
an amplifier. Id. at 506. In Silverman the Washington, D.C., police suspected a row house as
the headquarters for a gambling operation. The police gained access to an adjacent vacant row
house, from which the officers inserted the spike into a crevice until it touched a heating duct
of the adjacent house occupied by petitioners. Consequently, the officers could hear petitioners'
conversations through the telephone attachments to the inserted spike mike. Id. at 506-07.
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inserted into an adjacent party wall. The Supreme Court held that
the implantation of the microphone was a physical trespass that vio-
lated the fourth amendment because the government had not ob-
tained a warrant.43 The Court emphasized, however, that its holding
did not depend on the technicalities of local trespass law." In Lopez
v. United States45 the Supreme Court held that an Internal Revenue
Service agent's recording of a conversation between himself and a
suspect did not violate the fourth amendment.4e Defendant, who had
attempted to bribe the IRS agent, argued that the Court should not
admit the agent's testimony concerning incriminating conversations
with defendant because of his undercover participation in the bribery
scheme.47 The Court rejected defendant's argument that he possessed
a "right [under the Constitution] to rely on possible flaws in the
agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being
beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of
impeachment.
'48
Although Lopez concerned mere consensual electronic surveil-
lance,49 Justice Brennan's dissent 0 was a forerunner of a broader ap-
plication of the fourth amendment to electronic surveillance cases.51
Justice Brennan argued that subsequent Supreme Court decisions
had undermined Olmstead's reasoning and that the continued adher-
ence to Olmstead created an "intolerable anomaly that while conven-
tional searches and seizures are regulated by the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments," wiretapping is not.5 2 Justice Brennan asserted
that the Court repeatedly had recognized that "the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments interact to create a comprehensive right of privacy" '
and he maintained that the Court should not have allowed this
stance to be "outflanked by the technological advances of the very
recent past."5 Justice Brennan recognized that the "seemingly
43. Id. at 506-07, 511-12.
44. Id. at 511.
45. 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963).
46. Id. at 437-40. Defendant taxpayer Lopez had attempted to bribe an Internal Revenue
Service agent, who reported the attempt and thereafter received instructions "'to pretend to
play along with the scheme.'" Id. at 430. He therefore carried a pocket wire recorder during
later meetings with defendant to confirm the prior bribery attempt. Id. at 429-30.
47. Id. at 437.
48. Id. at 439.
49. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
50. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 446.
51. See Goldsmith, supra note 39, at -.
52. 373 U.S. at 471.
53. Id. at 456.
54. Id. at 471.
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anomalous" treatment of wiretapping grew from a "pervasive fear
that if electronic surveillance were deemed to be within the reach of
the Fourth Amendment, a useful technique of law enforcement would
be wholly destroyed, because an electronic 'search' could never be
reasonable within the meaning of the Amendment. '55 Attempting to
speak to these fears, the Justice wrote:
[I]t is premature to conclude that no warrant for an electronic search can possi-
bly be devised. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible,
or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement. It is at least
clear that "the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is
central to the Fourth Amendment," could be made a precondition of lawful ele-
tronic surveillance. And there have been numerous suggestions of ways in which
electronic searches could be made to comply with the other requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.
This is not to say that a warrant that will pass muster can actually be de-
vised. It is not the business of this Court to pass upon hypothetical questions,
and the question of the constitutionality of warrants for electronic surveillance
is at this stage purely hypothetical. But it is important that the question is still
an open one. Until the Court holds inadmissible the fruits of an electronic
search made, as in the instant case, with no attempt whatever to comply with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, there will be no incentive to seek
an imaginative solution whereby the rights of individual liberty and the needs of
law enforcement are fairly accommodated. 6
In Osborn v. United States7 the Court showed a sensitivity to
Justice Brennan's concerns and suggestions expressed in his Lopez
dissent. In Osborn the FBI procured a search warrant before permit-
ting an informant to record his conversation with defendant. Al-
though Lopez did not require a search warrant for consensual surveil-
lance, the Court reasoned that Justice Brennan's concerns expressed
in his Lopez dissent were dispositive since the FBI in fact had ob-
tained a warrant s.5 Accordingly, the germane issue no longer was "the
permissibility of 'indiscriminate use of [electronic] devices in law en-
forcement' ,,5" but rather, "the permissibility of using such a device
[electronic recorder] under the most precise and discriminate circum-
stances, circumstances which fully met the 'requirement of particu-
larity' which the dissenting opinion in Lopez found necessary." 60 The
Court held that the search warrant complied with the fourth amend-
ment because it delineated sufficiently "precise and discriminate"
55. Id. at 463.
56. Id. at 464-65 (citations and footnote omitted).
57. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
58. Id. at 327; see Goldsmith, supra note 39, at --. ; Schwartz, The Legitimation of Elec-
tronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REv. 455, 457-60 (1969).
59. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. at 329.
60. Id.; see, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 58, at 463-66; Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by
Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 172-73 (1969).
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procedures to govern the tape recording operation." The Osborn de-
cision alerted Congress that the Court would accept appropriately
drafted electronic surveillance legislation.2
2. Berger and Katz
One year after Osborn the Supreme Court "reconstitutional-
ized"63 the law of electronic surveillance with Berger v. New York
64
and Katz v. United States,6 which ultimately induced Congress to
adopt Title III. Defendant in Berger participated in a far-reaching
conspiracy to corrupt the New York State Liquor Authority. To
gather information against defendant by hidden microphones, the
district attorney obtained an eavesdropping warrant under a New
York statute that authorized court-sanctioned electronic surveil-
lance.6 8 The Berger Court declared the New York statute unconstitu-
tional under the fourth amendment because the statute had no curbs
to prevent wiretaps from becoming general, overly obtrusive
searches.67 The Court expressly held unconstitutional five aspects of
the surveillance statute.6 8 First, the statute authorized the issuance of
eavesdropping warrants based upon information insufficient for prob-
able cause. Second, the statute did not require the warrant to de-
scribe the conversations in detail. Third, the warrant's maximum
statutory life of two months was an excessive grant of authority be-
cause the statute required merely a single showing of probable
cause. 9 Fourth, the statute did not require the wiretap to end when
the government accomplished the purpose of its search: attaining the
targeted communication. Last, the statute did not require the author-
61. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. at 330-31.
62. See United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1972); Controlling Crime through More
Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 957 (1967) (testimony of Professor
G. Robert Blakey); J. CARR, supra note 39, § 1.02[2] (1977); Goldsmith, supra note 39, at
63. Goldsmith, supra note 39, at
64. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
65. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
66. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 43-45. For a description of the electronic surveillance
operations in Berger, see ABA PRoJEcT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILANCE 58-70 (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited
as ABA STANDARDS].
67. 388 U.S. at 54-60. The Court agreed with defendant's argument that the New York
eavesdropping statute permitted "a system of surveillance which involves trespassory intrusions
into private, constitutionally protected premises, [and] authorizes 'general searches' for 'mere
evidence."' Id. at 43-44.
68. See id. at 58-60.
69. The Court analogized the elongated surveillance period to a series of searches and
seizures authorized only upon a single showing of probable cause. Id. at 59.
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ities to give notice to the individual subject to the surveillance, nor
did it require a showing of exigent circumstances to render notice
unnecessary.70
Although declaring that the fourth amendment's" 'basic purpose
. . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary intrusions by government officials"' and that these safe-
guards apply to intangible as well as tangible items,71 the Berger
Court did not expressly reject the Olmstead doctrine, which limited
fourth amendment protection -to physical trespasses.7 During the fol-
lowing term in Katz v. United States,5 the Court stated that the
Olmstead doctrine no longer was controlling and formally extended
fourth amendment restrictions to nontrespassory wiretapping. 4 The
authorities in Berger actually had trespassed to install hidden micro-
phones;7 5 in Katz, however, the government placed electronic listen-
ing devices on the outside of a public telephone booth from which
defendant engaged in several incriminating conversations .7  The
Court determined that defendant possessed a reasonable expectation
of privacy77 in his conversations;7 8 consequently, interception of de-
fendant's conversations was a search and seizure under the fourth
amendment.79 Although the government agents had conducted the
surveillance with restraint as they would under a warrant, the Court
found that the government violated defendant's fourth amendment
interests because the agents' restraint was self-imposed and not com-
70. Id. at 58-60; see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71. 388 U.S. at 50-53 (quoting Canara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
72. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. Justice Douglas wrote, "I join the opin-
ion of the Court because at long last it overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. United States. .. "
388 U.S. at 64 (Douglas, J., concurring). The failure expressly to overrule Olmstead was partic-
ularly egregious since the government accomplished the surveillance in Berger through the in-
stallation of hidden microphones, which necessarily entails a trespass, and not through the non-
trespassory wiretapping used in Olrstead. Consequently after Berger, the question remained
unresolved whether the fourth amendment is available to invalidate a nontrespassory wiretap.
In Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), the Court rejected the proposition that the
government must obtain separate authorization to enter a building covertly to install the listen-
ing device. Instead, the Court held that an authorization to install a listening device concomi-
tantly authorizes the covert entry. Id. at 246-48.
73. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
74. The Court stated, "We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead... have been
so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no
longer be regarded as controlling." Id. at 353.
75. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 45.
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 348.
77. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).




pelled by a warrant from a neutral, scrutinizing magistrate.80
The Katz opinion affirmed the validity of statutes authorizing
police wiretaps, provided the statute imposes fourth amendment
safeguards.81 Therefore, following Berger and Katz a statute must re-
quire law enforcement officials to fulfill the following requirements
before obtaining a surveillance warrant: (1) probable cause must exist
to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a particu-
lar offense; (2) the government must describe particularly the
targeted communications; (3) the eavesdropping must be of limited
duration; (4) a separate showing of probable cause is necessary to
grant extensions; (5) the surveillance must end once the government
obtains the evidence it seeks; and (6) the government must give no-
tice unless it demonstrates exigent circumstances.82 The Katz deci-
sion goaded Congress to enact electronic surveillance legislation that
would comply with the fourth amendment.
B. The Suppression Sanction
Responding to Berger and Katz, Congress adopted Title III not
only to satisfy fourth amendment strictures but also to establish cer-
tain nonconstitutional limitations both to address the "unique attrib-
utes of electronic surveillance" and to regulate the "mode of execu-
tion of an electronic search."8" Therefore, to discourage governmental
overreaching in the conduct of the electronic surveillance, 4 Congress
believed that a restrictive statute with rigorous controls 85 was neces-
80. Id. at 356.
81. See id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 354. The Court conceded that advance notice is not necessary in electronic sur-
veillance cases, because the success of the surveillance depends on the suspect's ignorance.
Thus, the government need not give notice if it would "provoke the escape of the suspect or the
destruction of critical evidence." Id. at 355 n.16; see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 60.
83. See NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMM'N REP., supra note 12, at 22.
84. Section 2515 also applies to state proceedings under the supremacy and necessary and
proper clauses of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 & art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Congress
believed such a suppression rule "necessary and proper" to fulfill the objective of Title III in
protecting individual privacy. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2185. Several states' regu-
lation of the "mode of execution of an electronic search" vary from federal regulations. This
lack of consistency reflects either different statutory requirements or ad hoc responses to per-
ceived omissions in Title III. Before admitting trial evidence from electronic surveillance, states
at least must require compliance with Title III's preinterception requirements (governmental
compliance is a precondition to procure judicial authorization to install a wiretap), executional
requirements, and postinterception requirements. NATIONAL WIRETAPPING CoMM'N REP., supra
note 12, at 22.
85. Title III provides for electronic eavesdropping under a carefully detailed warrant and
strict court supervision. The warrant procedure includes requirements for justification and re-
porting of results that exceed the tasks required by traditional search warrant. See LEGISLATIVWE
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sary to control the quantum of government electronic surveillance.8 6
The legislative history indicated that Congress expected courts strin-
gently to enforce and strictly to construe the statute to secure indi-
viduals' fourth amendment privacy interests in wire and oral
communications.
8 7
To guarantee rigid adherence by law enforcement officials to Ti-
tle III, Congress looked to the conventional exclusionary rule, a com-
mon-law remedy requiring suppression at trial of evidence obtained
from an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment.88 The Court had developed this rule as a prophylactic
measure to deter fourth amendment violations by minimizing govern-
ment incentive to conduct an unreasonable search and seizure. 9 Con-
gress therefore established a statutory exclusionary rule for Title III
in section 2515.90 This section 2515 exclusionary rule precludes dis-
closure of an intercepted communication or its use in evidence if the
disclosure violates Title Ill.91 Because many Title III provisions are
not of a constitutional dimension as defined by the Supreme Court in
Berger and Katz, the impact of section 2515 thus exceeds that of the
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2189-95.
86. Id. at 2153-56.
87. Id. at 2177; see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 18.
88. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court imposed the ex-
clusionary rule on the federal courts and in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held
that state courts also must apply the exclusionary rule.
89. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1(f) (1978).
90. Section 2515 imposes an evidentiary sanction to compel compliance with other
prohibitions of Title III. The section provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of
such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in
any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department,
officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976). Section 2517(3) contains the major exception that permits testimonial
disclosure of surveillance evidence by any person receiving the communication by any means
authorized by Title III-any information concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence
derived therefrom, intercepted in accordance with Title III. Section 2515 is a stautory exclu-
sionary rule unique in United States criminal procedure. The deterrent purpose of § 2515 is the
same as that of the common-law exclusionary rule for fourth amendment violations, regardless
of its statutory form for transgressions of Title III provisions that exceed constitutional
requirements.
91. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2184-85. The Supreme Court has determined
that not all Title III provisions play a "substantive role" in Title III's regulatory scheme. Ac-
cordingly, the Court has held that suppression is necessary only when the Title III provision in
question "substantially implement[s] the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investi-
gative device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974). See United States v. Dono-
van, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
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conventional fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
Section 2518(10)(a) of Title 11192 provides that any aggrieved
person s may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire
or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom. The grounds
for this motion to suppress are (1) the government unlawfully inter-
cepted the communication; (2) the order of authorization or approval
for the interception was insufficient on its face; or (3) the method,
manner, or procedure used in intercepting the conversations violated
the wiretap order."" Section 2518(10)(a) in effect is the "remedy for
the right" under section 2515 to obtain suppression of illegally inter-
cepted communications. 5 The defendant may invoke the section
2515 suppression sanction only if he can demonstrate a violation enu-
merated in section 2518(10)(a).9 1
92. Section 2518(10)(a) provides that:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, de-
partment, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on
the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient
on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or
approval.
Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding unless there was no
opportunity to make such motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the mo-
tion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication,
or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this
chapter. The judge, upon the filing of such motion by the aggrieved person, may in his
discretion make available to the aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection such por-
tions of the intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as the judge deter-
mines to be in the interests of justice.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (Supp. 1981). Although § 2518(9) requires the government not less than
10 days before a trial, hearing, or other proceeding to furnish notice to each party that it inter-
cepted their communications, the legislative history shows that Congress explicitly recognized
the propriety of limiting access to intercepted communications or evidence derived therefrom.
Thus, courts should not transform the motion to suppress under § 2518(10)(a) into a wholesale
right for the defendant to conduct unmonitored, unrestricted discovery.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1976) defines an aggrieved person as "a person who was a party
to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was
directed."
94. The first category of § 2518(10)(a) engulfs the second and third categories, which are
cumulative and nondistinct from the all-inclusive terms of the first category. See LEGISLATIVE
HIsToRY, supra note 5, at 2195-97; NATIONAL WIRMAPPING COMM'N REP., supra note 12, at 99;
J. CARR, supra note 39, § 6.02[3], at 344. Section 2518(10)(a) reflects existing law. It applies to
wiretap evidence obtained directly or indirectly in violation of Title III. See Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
95. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2195.
96. United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1311 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
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Although section 2518(10)(a) provides the defendant with a pro-
cedural means to raise section 2515 rights to preclude the prosecution
from introducing unlawfully intercepted evidence, 97 section 2515
does not exclude wiretap evidence because of government deviations
from a postinterception requirement.95 None of the three subsections
of section 2518(10)(a) make reference to or incorporate any pos-
tinterception provisions of Title III;99 the sealing requirement0 " is
the postinterception provision most notably absent from the sec-
tion.101 Each subsection of section 2518(10)(a) refers to either the
preinterception stage or the executional stage of the surveillance.
Section 2518(10)(a), therefore, fails to provide a basis for suppression
of evidence tainted by postinterception violations of Title 1II.102
Thus, section 2518(10)(a) does not support the position of some cir-
cuits that the three grounds for suppression listed in section
2518(10)(a) include a violation of the sealing requirement.0 3 Conse-
1102 (1980) (Section 2515 imposes sanctions to compel compliance with prohibitions of Title III
and complements § 2518(10)(a), which delineates the grounds for suppression of wiretap evi-
dence and those who may make the motion).
97. Id.
98. J. CARR, supra note 39, § 6.02[3], at 345.
99. See id.
100. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
101. Regarding the relationship between the subsections of § 2518(10)(a), Professor Carr
states:
Senate Report 1097 does not indicate whether the second and third subcategories of §
2518(10)(a) are distinct from the first, or are supplemental or redundant. By its all-inclu-
sive terms, the first subsection would appear to state the grounds for a motion to suppress
adequately, without reference to either of the other two categories.
J. CARR, supra note 39, § 6.02[3], at 344. In United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), the
Supreme Court stated: "The words 'unlawfully intercepted' [referring to § 2518(10)(a)(i)] are
themselves not limited to constitutional violations. . . ." Id. at 527. In fact, courts have held
that "unlawfully intercepted" applies to nonconstitutional, statutory violations. See United
States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 172 (1977). The Court thus gave broad meaning to the first sub-
section and viewed the second and third subsections as supplemental provisions that would
allow "suppression for failure to observe some statutory requirements that would not render
interceptions unlawful under paragraph (i)." United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527. See
NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMM'N REP., supra note 12, at 129-30.
Giordano's attempt to salvage the independent relevance of subsections (ii) and (iii) of §
2518(10)(a) has no support in the legislative history. The most reasonable interpretation re-
gards subsections (ii) and (iii) as surplusage. See J. CARR, supra note 39, § 6.02[3], at 344; Note,
Judicial Sealing of Tape Recordings under Title III-A Need for Clarification, 15 AM. CraM.
L. REv. 89, 91 n.168, 93 (1977).
102. J. CARR, supra note 39, § 6.02[3], at 345-46; see United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d
1307, 1312 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980); United States v. Gigante, 538
F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd without opin-
ion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Caggiano, 667 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
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quently, a defendant should not be able to invoke the section 2515
suppression provision for a sealing requirement violation.
Section 2518(8)(a), however, contains its own independent exclu-
sionary provision directed specifically to failures to fulfill the sealing
mandate. The section delineates particular prerequisites for admis-
siblity and independently from section 2518(10)(a) excludes the evi-
dence from trial for governmental noncompliance with its provisions:
The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory expla-
nation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of
the contents of any wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom
under subsection (3) of section 2517.1"
Therefore, no need exists to consider whether a sealing violation also
renders the tapes inadmissible under section 2518(10)(a). 105 Congress
explicitly established alternative prerequisites for the use of wiretap
evidence in a judicial proceeding: the presence of a judicial seal or a
satisfactory explanation for its absence.10 6
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
At the end of the continuous period of interception the sealing
Angelini, 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United States v. Law-
son, 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975); see J. CAR, supra note 39, § 6.02[3], at 345.
The Third Circuit in United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 955 (1975), held that § 2518(10)(a) does not encompass transgressions of the sealing
requirement because a defendant may invoke § 2518(10)(a) only to suppress wiretap evidence
when the violation of the statute concerns a provision whose purpose and design was to limit
the use of intercept procedures. The Falcone court determined that a violation of § 2518(8)(a)
does not render intercepted communications unlawful under § 2518(10)(a)(i) because the pur-
pose of sealing is not to limit the use of intercept procedures, but rather to ensure the mainte-
nance of the integrity of the tapes after interception. 505 F.2d at 483-84; see United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). The legislative history demonstrates that Congress designed §
2518(8)(a) to ensure the keeping of accurate records concerning the intercepted communica-
tions. Congress believed such a provision to be of paramount importance to guarantee the pro-
tection of the tapes from editing and alteration. Congress also advocated the development of
appropriate procedures by the government to safeguard the identity, physical integrity, and the
contents of the recordings to ensure their admissibility in evidence. The sealing requirement of
§ 2518(8)(a) implements, to some extent, these concerns and desires of Congress. This reason-
ing led the Falcone court to hold that the sealing requirement itself did not authorize suppres-
sion, but rather that § 2518(8)(a) relied on the suppression motion of § 2518(10)(a) to enforce
the requirement. The Third Circuit's Falcone analysis effectively forecloses the defendant from
pursuing any remedy for governmental violation of the sealing requirement. This result obvi-
ously is contrary to congressional intent.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976).
105. See generally United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Vaz-
quez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1278 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 506-07 (2d Cir.
1977).
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requirement becomes effective.107 The sealing of all recordings made
pursuant to a Title III order is a post-authorization requirement
designed to guarantee the preservation of the tapes' integrity. The
courts of appeals agree that the failure immediately to obtain a seal
constitutes a preliminary violation of section 2518(8)(a) of Title
111.108 The presence of an intact seal attached immediately0 9 after
the expiration of the wiretap order or termination of the surveillance
is a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of the inter-
cepted communication, or evidence derived therefrom, under section
2517(3).1 The immediacy requirement of section 2518(8)(a) accom-
plishes the underlying purpose of the sealing requirement by fore-
closing potential tampering with the tapes"' because it theoretically
precludes the passage of any substantial amount of time between the
lapse of the wiretap and the delivery of the tapes to the judge for
107. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
108. NATIONAL WRETAPPING COM'N REP., supra note 12, at 99. The Commission found
that every court that had considered an alleged sealing violation had construed the absence of a
seal, or a failure to seal promptly, as a prima facie violation of § 2518(8)(a).
109. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
110. Section 2517(3) prohibits disclosure of wiretap evidence in any judicial proceeding
unless the government complies with every Title H requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1976).
See supra note 23.
111. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2193-94; see United States v. Vazquez, 605
F.2d 1269, 1278 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that sealing ought to occur within one or two days, and
accordingly any delay beyond two days requires an explanation). No concensus exists regarding
what constitutes a satisfactory explanation under the statute for a sealing that is less than
immediate. Id. Many courts, however, are quite lenient and have refused to suppress evidence
when the sealing delays exceeded two days. See, e.g., United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469
(7th Cir. 1977) (sealing delays of 9, 26, and 38 days), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United
States v. Diadone; 558 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1977) (two-week sealing delay), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1064 (1978); United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.) (14-day sealing delay), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975) (57-day delay);
United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974) (45-day sealing delay), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Poets, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.) (13-day sealing delay), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (24- and
42-day delays), aff'd without opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977). In some instances the courts
overlook sealing delays without a satisfactory explanation proffered by the government. See
infra note 167 and accompanying text.
Some courts construed the statutory mandate of "immediately" to mean "without unneces-
sary or unreasonable delay." See, e.g., People v. Carter, 81 Misc. 2d 345, 348-49, 365 N.Y.S.2d
964, 968 (Nassau County Ct. 1975). Still other courts found the term "immediately" to denote
delivery of the recordings to the court "promptly, within a reasonable time, or with reasonable
diligence" after completion of the surveillance. See, e.g., People v. Blanda, 80 Misc. 2d 79, 83,
362 N.Y.S.2d 735, 741 (Sup. Ct. 1974). Moreover, other courts selected a bright-line evaluation
and found sealing to be possible within one or two days after completion of the interception.
Consequently, any delay exceeding two days will result in a nonimmediate sealing that requires
an explanation. See infra note 120.
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sealing. 1 2 Furthermore, the statute on its face appears to compel
suppression of the tapes for a governmental failure to fulfill this im-
mediacy requirement, or for a complete failure ever to obtain a seal
for the tapes at all. Without an immediate sealing, tapes are admissi-
ble only upon the offering of a "satisfactory explanation" for the ab-
sence of a timely seal. 3 This strict reading of section 2518(8)(a) in-
dicates that unless the government provides such an explanation that
satisfies the court, the court must exclude the tainted evidence.
By including a satisfactory explanation exception in section
2518(8)(a), the drafters of Title III enabled the government to cir-
cumvent the obligations and purpose of the sealing requirement. The
admission of the tapes under this exception notwithstanding the lack
of an immediate sealing thwarts the purpose of the sealing require-
ment,11 4 because the satisfactory explanation does not address the in-
tegrity of the tapes. The explanation itself does not assure that the
tapes are reliable, accurate renditions of the recorded conversations.
112. Minor variances from the exact requirements of the statute will not result in sup-
pression in many cases. See United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 948 (1972). Upon completion of the wiretap in Poeta, the judge who issued the order
was on vacation. The applicable New York statute requires sealing the tapes under the direc-
tion of the "issuing justice." N.Y. CRiM. PRo. LAW § 700.50(2) (McKinney 1971). The police
waited 13 days and then presented the tapes to another judge for sealing. The Second Circuit
concluded:
Section 2518(8)(a) provides that in the absence of a seal the tapes might be used in evi-
dence if "a satisfactory explanation for the absence" is made. A fortiori, where, as here,
the tapes are sealed, a satisfactory explanation for the delay will allow their use in evi-
dence. We are satisfied that the delay of the police in delivering the tapes for sealing was
entirely excusable .. .
United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d at 122. See supra notes 17-19.
113. See United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lilla, 534
F. Supp. 1247, 1271-72 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 727 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); United States v. Ricco, 421 F. Supp. 401, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 566 F.2d 433 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd without opinion, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. United States v. Mc-
Grath, 622 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1980) (consideration of tape integrity is relevant in finding a satis-
factory explanation).
114. The function of the postinterception procedural requirements is to preserve the in-
tegrity of the intercepted communication and to prevent any tampering or editing of the tapes
or other unlawful use. See United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1314 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980); McMillan v. United States, 558 F.2d 877, 878 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 624, 627-28 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gigante, 538
F.2d 502, 506-07, (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United States v. Lilla, 534 F. Supp. 1247, 1271-72 (N.D.N.Y. 1982);
United States v. DePalna, 461 F. Supp. 800, 825-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Aloi, 449
F. Supp. 698, 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Ricco, 421 F. Supp. 401, 406-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), af'd, 566 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v.




The circuit courts unfortunately have not recognized the inherent
contradiction between the satisfactory explanation exception and the
purpose of Title III, nor have they realized that they exacerbate this
contradiction through lenient interpretation of the exception. Thus,
the courts use various, often conflicting methods to resolve delayed
sealing problems.
A. The Second Circuit Approach
In 1976 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Gigante115 meticulously construed section
2518(8)(a) and held that the absence of an immediately applied seal
constitutes a violation of section 2518(8)(a) that requires exclusion of
the evidence unless the government can provide a satisfactory expla-
nation.1 6 In Gigante the government failed to seal wiretapping tapes
"immediately" after the expiration of the judicial order authorizing
the surveillance 17 and thus expressly violated section 2518(8)(a).
118
The court interpreted the provision for a satisfactory explanation as
providing an alternative to the sealing requirement. Therefore, under
this analysis the government must meet one of two conditions before
it may use wiretap evidence: It must have acquired a judicial seal
immediately after the termination of the surveillance or it satisfacto-
rily must explain the failure to seal immediately. 1 9 Although the gov-
ernment in Gigante conceded that it had no satisfactory explanation
115. 538 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976).
116. Id. at 506-07.
117. Id. at 506. The Gigante court stated that a satisfactory explanation for a delay in
sealing or for an absence of a seal must exist before the tapes are admissible into evidence. The
court held that because law enforcement officials delayed the delivery of tapes to the issuing
judge, in some cases exceeding one year, and because they could not explain this failure, the
court ordered suppression of those tapes and evidence derived therefrom. Id. at 507.
118. The language of the statute requires the government to seal the tapes immediately.
See LEGISLATr HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2193; supra note 16. "Seal provided for by this
subsection" requires presentation to the judge "shortly after the surveillance is terminated."
See J. CARR, supra note 39, § 5.1212], at 281; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 66, at 160. In United
States v. Vazqudz, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979), the court presumed that a sealing delay sur-
passing two days fell outside the scope of the immediacy requirement of § 2518(8)(a) and ac-
cordingly required a satisfactory explanation. The court ruled that a sealing delay exceeding
two days is less than immediate because "cases illustrate that sealing is often possible within
one or two days." Id. at 1278.
119. The dissent in United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 486 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975), required a satisfactory explanation not only for total failure to seal
the tapes but also for failure to seal the tapes immediately. The Gigante court adopted this
reasoning and concluded that any other interpretation would vitiate the statutory purpose of
protecting the integrity of the tapes. United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1976).
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for noncompliance with section 2518(8)(a)' 20 and thus could not meet
either condition, it claimed that the court should not order suppres-
sion because defendants failed to present any evidence demonstrat-
ing that the tapes themselves had sustained any tampering or altera-
tion.12 The Gigante court rejected this argument because it
undercuts the congressional desire that the judiciary supervise the
sealing process immediately after surveillance terminates. Because
the delay in sealing was extensive and because the government did
120. The courts have approved various "satisfactory" explanations. For example, in
United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972), the govern-
ment failed to present the recorded tapes to the court for sealing immediately upon expiration
of the last wiretap order as mandated by § 2518(8)(a). After allowing 13 days to pass, the
government submitted the recordings for sealing to a judge who had not issued the wiretap
order. The government failed to acquire a seal immediately because it believed that only the
judge who issued the warrant could direct sealing and the issuing judge was on vacation when
the order expired. The court regarded this explanation as satisfactory and did not suppress the
tape-recorded evidence.
In United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979), the delay in sealing various
tapes ranged from seven to thirteen days. The government complained that the massive investi-
gation caused shortages in both personnel and equipment because most of the intercepted con-
versations were in Spanish and only four Spanish-speaking agents were available to monitor the
taping, to make copies of the 260 tape reels, to check the duplicates for audibility, and finally to
label each of the 520 tapes. Id. at 1279. The government asserted that these hinderances caused
the sealing delay. The court accepted the government's explanation as sufficient to permit ad-
mission of the tapes into evidence. The court stated, "the government's lack of foresight regard-
ing the actual scope of the investigation does not justify the exclusion of probative evidence
lawfully obtained." Id. In United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 403 (1978), the court excused a seven-day delay in sealing because preparation for the
upcoming trial preoccupied the time of the government attorneys. In United States v. McGrath,
622 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1980), the court excused delays of three to eight days since the delay was
relatively short and was unavoidable because of the dispersion of tape processing facilities.
Courts have considered various elements when determining whether the government's ex-
planation is "satisfactory" under § 2518(8)(a). These elements include the length of the delay,
see United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d
633 (2d Cir. 1977), evidence of tampering, see United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Poets, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972), time
required for duplicating, labelling, checking, and preparing the tapes for sealing, see United
States v. Ricco, 566 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978), and whether the
defendants were prejudiced by the delay, see United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 403 (1978). In United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), the government delayed sealing tapes from five to seven days because the issuing judge
was unavailable, the district attorney briefly was ill, and the office staff required time to check
and catalogue the tapes. The court found these explanations satisfactory under § 2518(8)(a).
121. Several courts have refused to suppress tapes for sealing delays absent a challenge by
the defendant regarding the authenticity of the tapes used against him or an allegation of tape
alteration. See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 955 (1975); Cerbo v. Fauver, 469 F. Supp. 1004 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 714 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 828-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no suppression because defendants could not establish any breach compromis-
ing the security of the remaining tapes).
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not satisfactorily explain the delay, the Gigante court suppressed the
surveillance evidence. Hence, Gigante and its Second Circuit progeny
adopted the position that the absence of an immediately applied
seal-or a satisfactory explanation for its absence-requires suppres-
sion without inquiry into whether the government fulfilled the pur-
pose underlying the sealing requirement despite the delay.122 Accord-
ingly, Gigante established the premise that the absence of an
allegation of tape tampering by the defendant will not constitute a
satisfactory explanation for a sealing delay.
Four years after Gigante the Second Circuit in United States v.
McGrath1 2' retreated from this rigid position and asserted that a lack
of any evidence of tape tampering or alteration may transform an
otherwise inadequate explanation into a satisfatory explanation. In
McGrath the appellants moved to suppress three wiretap tapes since
the government failed to proffer a satisfactory explanation under sec-
tion 2518(8)(a) for delays of three to eight days in sealing the tapes.
The court held that a satisfactory explanation was absolutely essen-
tial to overcome a sealing requirement violation. Contrary to the pre-
vious ruling in Gigante, the McGrath court also held that if the de-
fendant does not produce evidence of prejudice from the sealing
delay, of tape tampering, or of governmental bad faith, then a court
properly may find that the government's explanation is satisfac-
tory.124 The court held that the sealing delays in McGrath did not
contravene section 2518(8)(a) because:
122. The Gigante court's interpretation is stricter than those of the Third, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits. The rigid gloss Gigante placed on the sealing requirement effectively elevates
the immediate sealing requirement to a more protected status than any of the other procedural
requirements of Title III. See Angelini v. United States, 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978). The court in United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980), did not consider Gigante's holding a significant restriction of
the admission of evidence under § 2518(8) (a), except that perhaps a lack of evidence of tamper-
ing will be insufficient to allow the admission of wiretap evidence after a violation of §
2518(8)(a). Id. at 1313-14.
Rejecting Gigante, the Fifth Circuit has held that a lack of any evidence of tampering
completely overcomes a § 2518(8)(a) violation. See United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d 775, 780
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). The Third and Seventh Circuits have held
that a lack of any evidence of tampering may overcome the violation. See United States v.
Angelini, 565 F.2d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United States v.
Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
123. 622 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1980).
124. Id. at 42-43. The Second Circuit viewed as two separate issues (1) its satisfaction
with the explanation for delay and (2) the sufficiency of evidence of the tapes' integrity. The
court held that evidence supporting the integrity of the tapes significantly will affect the court's
satisfaction with the government's explanation and thus lessen its willingness to suppress the
wiretap evidence. See id.
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[h]ere, however, given that the delay was relatively short and included one
weekend, and that no evidence of prejudice or foul play was presented, we ac-
cept as satisfactory the Government's explanation that it was "reasonably neces-
sary" to transport the tapes from Binghamton to Albany for duplication and
processing, and thence to Auburn for sealing.
1 2 5
B. The Approach of the Third and Eighth Circuits
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
United States v. Falcone126 and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in McMillan v. United States"1 declared that
they will not suppress taped evidence because of a sealing delay un-
less the defendant can prove that tape tampering or alteration has
compromised the integrity of the tapes.1 28 These circuits characterize
a violation of the sealing requirement as a mere technicality that
alone is insufficient to justify suppression.
United States v. Falcone1 29 concerned two court-authorized
wiretaps of defendant's conversations.3 0 In each instance the govern-
ment delayed forty-five days in sealing the tapes.131 The government
explained that the need to make a composite tape and a transcript of
the tapes caused the delay.13 Construing the satisfactory explanation
exception of section 2518(8)(a) as an alternative to the sealing re-
quirement,133 the court found that a failure to seal the tapes immedi-
ately is not a violation that necessarily requires suppression as a mat-
ter of law.13 4 The court ruled that because the integrity of the tapes is
the "crucial factor,"'3 5 the absence of an immediately applied seal is
an insufficient reason to suppress the evidence if the defendant can-
not impeach the intregity of the tapes. 3 6 The Third Circuit reiter-
ated this interpretation of section 2518(8)(a) in Cerbo v. Fauver,37 in
125. Id. at 43.
126. 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
127. 558 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977).
128. For a discussion of the means by which a defendant can show governmental tape
tampering, see infra note 180.
129. 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
130. 505 F.2d at 480 n.6.
131. Id. at 485 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 486 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
133. The Falcone court did not mention the satisfactory explanation provision and gave
as an example that police confusion had constituted a satisfactory explanation in another case.
The court, however, did not hold that the government gave a satisfactory explanation in this




137. 616 F.2d 714 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980).
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which petitioner never challenged the authenticity of the tapes nor
alleged any tampering with those tapes. The Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's refusal to order suppression for the sealing delay
and emphasized that absent a claim of tampering, a sealing delay per
se will not constitute grounds for suppression notwithstanding the
length of the sealing delay.138 Moreover, the Third Circuit specifically
denounced the Second Circuit's Gigante holding as contrary to its
own holding in Falcone."9
In McMillan v. United States'40 the Eighth Circuit emphasized
that the purpose of the sealing provision is to ensure preservation of
the integrity of the tapes after the interception.141 Because defendant
failed to allege that governmental impropriety impaired the accuracy
of the tapes during the sealing delay, the court implied that suppres-
sion would be an inappropriate sanction in this instance since the
violation would be inconsequential and technical. 142 Unless the defen-
dant challenges the tapes' integrity, the courts of the Eighth Circuit
will presume their accuracy. 4 s
Under the approach of the Third and Eighth Circuits, a court
will order suppression of surveillance tapes only if the defendant
demonstrates that the government somehow compromised the integ-
rity of the tapes during the sealing delay. Conversely, the Second Cir-
cuit requires that the government satisfactorily explain its failure to
seal the tapes immediately; otherwise, the court will order suppres-
sion. Absence of evidence that the government compromised the in-
tegrity of the tapes will further a finding under the Second Circuit's
approach that the government proffered a satisfactory explanation.
C. The Approach of the Fourth Circuit
In United States v. Diana14 4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether inquiry into governmental
tampering with or editing of the tapes is either appropriate or dispos-
itive in determining whether the government provided a satisfactory
explanation for the sealing delay.14 5 The court acknowledged that
138. Id. at 716.
139. Id.; see supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
140. 558 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977).
141. Id. at 878.
142. Id. at 879.
143. Id.
144. 605 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980). Thirty-nine days




Congress intended sealing to preclude governmental interference
with the tapes and thus to ensure accurate representations of the re-
corded conversations.146 The court questioned whether a finding that
the government satisfied the purpose of section 2518(8)(a) also
should determine that the government's explanation is satisfactory.
147
The court, however, stated that "this fact would have at least some
bearing on whether the explanation was satisfactory. 14" In holding
that inquiry into whether the government tampered with the tapes
was "appropriate in determining" 149 whether the explanation was sat-
isfactory, the Fourth Circuit parallelled the approach of the Third
and Eighth Circuits.150 Concluding that the Second Circuit in United
States v. Gigante excluded the taped evidence solely because of ex-
tensive sealing delays of eight to twelve months,1 51 the Diana court
held that an extensive delay will preclude the government's use of
the satisfactory explanation exception to overcome a section
2518(8)(a) violation. The Diana court found, however, that the gov-
ernment's explanation for the sealing delay was satisfactory on its
face and that the court did not need to consider the unchallenged
integrity of the tapes to infer a satisfactory explanation.
1 52
Thus, like the Second Circuit in United States v. McGrath, s
the Fourth Circuit requires the government to produce a satisfactory
explanation to prevent suppression for a sealing requirement viola-
tion. Under the Fourth Circuit approach, however, a finding that the
government fulfilled the purpose of the sealing requirement during
the sealing delay renders the government's explanation satisfactory.
In application, the Fourth Circuit approach is similar to that of the
Third and Eighth Circuits because all hold that a determination of
preserved tape integrity during the sealing delay will render inconse-
quential the violation of the sealing provision. The Fourth Circuit ap-
proach is distinguishable from these other approaches because the
Fourth Circuit will not allow the government to use the satisfactory
explanation exception to avoid suppression if the delay in sealing is
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1312-14.
148. Id. at 1313.
149. Id. at 1314.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1313-14.
152. Id. at 1314. The court held that the government fulfilled the purpose of the sealing
requirement, and that the explanation proffered by the government for the delay in sealing was
reasonable "based in part on considerations other than the fact that the integrity of the tapes is
not challenged." Id. at 1316.
153. 622 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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of great length. Thus, although the length of the sealing delay is im-
portant under Fourth Circuit analysis, under the approach of the
Third and Eighth Circuits a sealing delay with no evidence of tape
tampering will not require suppression, irrespective of the length of
the delay.
D. The Approach of the Fifth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Diadone15 held that a failure to seal or a delay in
sealing the tapes immediately upon completion of the surveillance
will necessitate suppression of the tapes if the defendant demon-
strates that the delay prejudiced him or that the delay compromised
the integrity of the tapes.155 If the defendant cannot demonstrate
prejudice or compromised integrity of the tapes, the court will disre-
gard the violation of the sealing requirement and will refuse to sup-
press the evidence.
156
Like the Third and Eighth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit rejects the
Second Circuit requirement that the government satisfactorily must
explain a failure to seal surveillance tapes before the tapes are admis-
sible at trial. Furthermore, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Cir-
cuit considers the length of the sealing delay irrelevant in determin-
154. 558 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
155. See infra note 180.
156. In the Fifth Circuit all aspects of the sealing requirement are secondary to the fulfill-
ment of the congressional purpose behind § 2518(8)(a). In United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d
837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975), the government waited 14 days after the expi-
ration of the wiretap order to deliver the recordings to the judge for sealing. The government
explained that the recordings remained in the FBI evidence room for seven days and the search
warrant required an additional seven days to prepare. The court concluded that the govern-
ment substantially complied with § 2518(8)(a) because defendant did not show that the integ-
rity of the interception was questionable or that the delay prejudiced him. Id. at 840. In United
States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976), the authorizing judge
received the tapes of the wiretapped conversations five weeks after termination of the wiretap.
Because the parties stipulated to facts showing the chain of custody and a lack of alteration to
the tapes, the court found no violation of the sealing requirement. Id. at 45-46. In United
States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978), defen-
dants failed to show that the government disturbed the integrity of the interception in any way.
The tapes were not suppressed even though the government breached its duty to surrender the
tapes to the court immediately upon completion of the interception. In United States v. Caggi-
ano, 667 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1982), the court declined to suppress wiretapping evidence al-
though the government technically violated § 2518(8)(b), which is the procedural aspect of the
sealing requirement. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The court found that the pur-
pose of § 2518(8)(b), like that of § 2518(8)(a), is to preserve the confidentiality of the wiretap
applications and orders. Defendants did not allege that the procedures the government used
breached any confidence. The court suggested that suppression perhaps is appropriate when
the government deliberately circumvents the sealing requirement. Id. at 1179.
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ing admissibility. The Fifth Circuit instead mandates the suppression
of surveillance tapes for a sealing delay only if the defendant demon-
strates prejudice or doubtful tape integrity. This added opportunity
for the defendant to obtain suppression of the tapes upon a showing
of prejudice distinguishes the approach of the Third and Eighth Cir-
cuits from that of the Fifth Circuit.
E. The Approach of the Seventh Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
based its approach largely upon the Ninth Circuit's holding in
United States v. Chun.157 The Ninth Circuit had adopted a test to
determine when governmental violations of particular Title III provi-
sions mandate suppression of electronic surveillance evidence. The
conditions for admission are: First, the particular procedure must be
a central or functional safeguard of the Title III scheme to prevent
abuses, and second, the government has satisfied the purpose of the
procedure notwithstanding the delay, or the government did not de-
liberately ignore the statutory requirement and thereby gain a tacti-
cal advantage. 158 In 1975 the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Lawson 59 applied the Chun test specifically to a violation of section
2518(8)(a) and held that the absence of an immediate seal will not
violate section 2518(8)(a) and will not require suppression if: (1) de-
spite the error, the law enforcement authorities accomplished the
purpose for which Congress designed the sealing requirement, and (2)
the violation of the sealing provision was not purposeful and in no
sense conveyed to the government a tactical advantage."' 0 The Law-
son court concluded that section 2518(8)(a) is a central or functional
safeguard of the Title III scheme to prevent abuses because it is a
"statutory requirement . .. that directly and substantially imple-
ment[ed] the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of
this extraordinary investigative device." 161 Consequently, any viola-
157. 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1975). Chun did not concern a sealing requirement violation
but rather a failure to give defendants a formal inventory notice under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d)
(1976).
158. Id. at 542. The Chun court did not determine whether violations of § 2518(8)(a) fall
under its test. The court merely concluded that if the government fails the test, then the gov-
ernment's conduct violates the statute and the court will suppress the wiretap evidence under §
2518(10)(a)(i). Id. at 538-42.
159. 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975).
160. The Lawson court held that § 2518(8)(a) is a central or functional safeguard in the
Title III scheme to prevent abuses. See id. at 564.
161. Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974)).
352 [Vol. 36:325
SURVEILLANCE EVIDENCE
tions of section 2518(8)(a) fall within the scope of section
2518(10)(a)(i) 16 2 and require suppression under the Chun test if the
government did not fulfill the purpose of section 2518(8)(a) or if the
government purposely ignored the sealing requirement and gained a
tactical advantage over the defendant.
Two years later the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Ange-
lini'6 tempered its constructon of the sealing requirement and inter-
preted section 2518(8)(a) more consistently with the statutory lan-
guage. The court read section 2518(8)(a) entirely in conjunction with
section 2518(10)(a) and contemplated a two-step analysis in consider-
ing delayed sealing problems. In an approach identical to the Second
Circuit's, the Seventh Circuit ruled that if the government does not
seal the tapes immediately, the court must decide whether the gov-
ernment has offered a satisfactory explanation. If the government
cannot provide a satisfactory explanation, then the court will apply
the Chun test, which the government must meet to avoid suppression
of the wiretap evidence. 6 4 The Angelini analysis expands the Lawson
approach because it adopts a two-step method: Is the explanation
satisfactory? If it is satisfactory, then the evidence is admissible. If it
is unsatisfactory, the court will apply section 2518(10)(a) and the
Chun test. In determining whether to suppress surveillance evidence
because of a sealing requirement violation, this Seventh Circuit ap-
proach disregards the length of the sealing delay or the extent of
prejudice to the defendant from the sealing delay.1 15
IV. ANALYSIS
Neither the Gigante nor the McGrath approaches of the Second
Circuit effectuate the ostensible purpose of the sealing requirement:
to provide an external safeguard against manipulation of recorded ev-
idence."' Title III's sealing requirement does not itself foreclose ex-
tensive governmental alteration and editing of wiretapping tapes be-
cause if the government delays for too long to procure an
"immediate" seal, the satisfactory explanation loophole assures ad-
162. See United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1038 (1977).
163. 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
164. Id.
165. In Angelini the government delayed in sealing three tapes for 9, 26, and 38 days. 565
F.2d at 470. The court admitted the tapes into evidence because it found that the government's
explanation was satisfactory and because the government's conduct did not undermine the
objectives of the Title III sealing requirement. Id. at 473.
166. Id.; see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
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missibility of the evidence. Of course, the court may not find the ex-
cuse satisfactory, but in practice the Second Circuit will transform
almost any believable excuse for the delay into a satisfactory expla-
nation.16 7 Unfortunately, nothing precludes government officials who
are determined to convict a defendant from tampering with the tapes
during the interim between completion of the surveillance and acqui-
sition of an affixed seal. Moreover, in deciding whether to suppress
taped evidence the Second Circuit does not expressly consider the
length of time the government possessed the unsealed tapes after ter-
mination of the wiretap, or whether this delay places the integrity of
the tapes in doubt. The Second Circuit has not yet confronted a case
in which the government provides a satisfactory explanation for the
delay but the defendant challenges the integrity of the tapes.'68 In
Gigante, for example, the government did not seal the wiretap tapes
for more than one year after expiration of the authorizing order. The
Gigante court specifically conditioned suppression on the govern-
ment's failure to explain the delay satisfactorily-the court did not
consider the length of the delay. By overlooking the duration of de-
lay, the Second Circuit is heedless of overzealous prosecutors who
may alter the tapes to convert exculpatory statements into inculpa-
tory ones or to augment the incriminating nature of the entire tape
and then proffer a manufactured explanation the courts would deem
satisfactory.16 9 Because the Second Circuit has strictly interpreted
167. See, e.g., United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 903 (1978); supra note 120.
The satisfactory explanation exception of § 2518(8)(a) resembles a good faith exception for
sealing requirement violations. The legislative history does not explain the reason Congress
included a provision excusing literal compliance with the sealing requirement. One court has
defined a satisfactory explanation as "one in which the Government shows that it acted with
dispatch and all reasonable diligence to meet the sealing requirement, respectful of the letter
and spirit of Title III and mindful of the construction it has been given in the Courts." United
States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); see J.
CARR, supra note 39, at 84-85.
168. In all sealing cases to-date no defendant has questioned the integrity of the tapes
when the government has proffered an explanation for a sealing delay.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Mouton, 617 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir.) (defendant alleged
that prosecutor tampered with tapes of defendant's telephone conversations), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 860 (1980); United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976) (defendant alleged
prosecutorial tampering with trial exhibit, but court ruled that defendant did not overcome the
presumption that the government did not tamper with the evidence); United States v. Fletcher,
487 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he material was not always firmly sealed, and at least
fifteen persons had access to the evidence room where it was kept. These objections go to the
weight, not the admissibility of the evidence ...."), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974); Wil-
liams v. United States, 381 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1967) ("The [trial] court did not exclude the
possibility of tampering, but properly left the question with the jury as bearing on reasonable
doubt of guilt."); Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960) ("Factors to be
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the language of the sealing requirement 170 and has not welcomed alle-
gations of governmental tape tampering, a challenge to the tapes' in-
tegrity likely will not significantly affect the court's determination re-
garding suppression.
The Third and Eighth Circuits conspicuously disregard the satis-
factory explanation exception of section 2518(8)(a) and instead carve
out their own exception that enables the government to circumvent
the suppression sanction. If the defendant has no meritorious chal-
lenge to tape integrity, these circuits refuse to suppress evidence be-
cause of a sealing delay. Falcone and McMillan effectively illustrate
that the defendant must bear the burden to demonstrate that the
government altered or edited the tapes or that the tapes otherwise
convey an inaccurate account of the conversations. To lay this bur-
den on the defendant is unreasonable; 171 most defendants do not pos-
considered [in deciding admissibility of evidence] include the nature of the article, the circum-
stances surrounding the preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of intermeddlers
tampering with it.").
170. See, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Gigante, 538 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976).
171. See J. CARR, supra note 39, § 5.12[4], at 283. The defendant may allege, for example,
intentional tampering or alteration, accidental erasure, damage, confusion, or loss of tapes that
alters the overall interpretation of the conversations. See id. at 282. The government prepares
duplicate tapes for continued investigative and trial purposes. In many jurisdictions govern-
ment agents record duplicates simultaneously with the originals, but in others agents make
duplicates shortly after they remove the original tape from the recorder. NATIONAL WIRETAP-
PING COMM'N REP., supra note 12, at 88. Section 2517 specifically lists the situations in which
the government may use or disclose the contents of a tape. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1976); United
States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Applications of Kansas City Star,
666 F.2d 1168, 1175 (8th Cir. 1981). Section 2517(2) provides:
Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by the
chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral communication or
evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to
the proper performance of his official duties.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (1976). On its face, § 2517(2) permits the government to use the contents of
intercepted communications to make duplicate recordings of the original tapes after sealing,
because the courts surely would regard such use as "appropriate to the proper performance of
his [the government agent's] official duties." Hence, the need to make duplicate tapes after
sealing may augment the already substantial opportunity for governmental tape alteration. In
United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982), the court held that no specific subsec-
tion of § 2517 permits a judge to open sealed surveillance evidence to the press simply because
the contents are newsworthy. Id. at 1231-33. The court stated that § 2517 limits the use or
disclosure of such evidence outside trial proceedings to investigative and law enforcement of-
ficers. Under § 2518(8)(b), however, the government may obtain disclosure of applications and
orders after sealing "upon a showing of good cause before a judge of competent jurisdiction."
For example, in United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 945 (1977), the court authorized the Department of Justice to unseal, copy, and return
signature papers from the wire interception authorizations. See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 9, at 2194. Although attempts to develop tamperproof and editproof tapes and re-
cording devices are continuous, the Wiretap Commission unconvincingly stated that "[p]erhaps
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sess the necessary resources to detect sophisticated alterations of
tapes. 17 12 The officers making the recordings should bear the burdens
of compliance and justification because they should be able to comply
with the delivery requirements of the sealing provision.
The Fourth Circuit also imposes upon the defendant the burden
of demonstrating prejudice because of questionable tape integrity.
The Fourth Circuit declined to address the propriety of the position
of the Third and Eighth Circuits and avoided the issue by stating:
[S]ince we find, however, a satisfactory explanation[' 1'J in this case based in part
on considerations other than the fact that the integrity of the tapes is not chal-
lenged, we need not decide if we would allow the evidence to be admitted solely
on the basis of the fact that no tampering has been shown.17
Unlike the Third and Eighth Circuits, however, the Fourth Circuit in
Diana determined that the length of the sealing delay, especially if it
is extensive, substantially affects the availability to the government
of the satisfactory explanation exception to avoid exclusion of wire-
tap evidence. 175 Primarily, the Fourth Circuit emphasizes that the
government must fulfill Congress' purpose in requiring sealing to en-
able the court conscientiously to deem the explanation satisfactory.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit will admit the unsealed taped evi-
dence even if the explanation itself is inadequate or not forthcoming
at all.
We repeat that we feel the district court's finding of a satisfactory explanation
was not in error. The integrity of the tapes is not questioned, and we take into
account the extra precautions taken with respect to them. Therefore, the pur-
pose of the sealing requirement has been fulfilled, and, as discussed earlier, this





Under the Fifth Circuit's approach, the defendant's suppression mo-
the best protection against alteration is the absence of a motive to edit court-ordered surveil-
lance, as it is based on probable cause and is closely supervised by superior officers, the prose-
cutor, and the judge." NATIONAL WImTAPPING COMM'N REP., supra note 12, at 89.
172. J. CARR, supra note 39, § 5.1214], at 282; see infra note 180.
173. The government argued that malfunctioning equipment necessitated the sealing de-
lay because duplicates could not provide the needed information for preparation of the indict-
ment, warrants, and transcripts. United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1314-15 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980).
174. 605 F.2d at 1314.
175. The court did not necessarily find that this decision conflicted with Gigante. The
Diana court distinguished Gigante because in Gigante the delay was inordinately long, irregu-
larities existed in the tape storage process, and the government could not proffer a satisfactory
explanation for its "haphazard procedures" to ensure the integrity of the tapes. The govern-
ment in Diana, however, employed many protections to ensure the integrity of the tapes. Id. at
1313-16.
176. Id. at 1316.
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tion will prevail notwithstanding a satisfactory explanation for delay
if the defendant can demonstrate that the integrity of the tapes is
doubtful or if the delay has prejudiced him.1"7 This additional oppor-
tunity to demonstrate prejudice distinguishes the Fifth Circuit ap-
proach from that of the Third and Eighth Circuits. 17  The Fifth Cir-
cuit has not indicated whether failure by the government to comply
with the sealing requirement ever will sufficiently prejudice the de-
fendant to justify suppression of the wiretap evidence.1 79 Although
the Fifth Circuit never has specified the nature of prejudice to the
defendant under section 2518(8)(a), the defendant apparently can
demonstrate prejudice through sustainable claims of tape tampering
or editing by the government.18 0 Prejudice, however, should not in-
177. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
179. In every case the Fifth Circuit perfunctorily has addressed the prejudice issue raised
by the defendant. For example, the court in United States v. Sklaroff stated:
There was a delay of fourteen days. There was no showing of prejudice to the defendants
in the delay. The purpose of this provision of the statute is to safeguard the recordings
from editing or alteration. There was no showing that the integrity of the interceptions
was in any way violated. The government accounted for the delay .... There was sub-
stantial compliance with the requirements on the part of the government and the author-
izing judge.
United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840-41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975).
180. Admittedly, when law enforcement officials seize incriminating conversations, they
have almost no motive to tamper with the tapes. The possibility of tampering arises, however,
when the government believes the seized evidence is not sufficiently incriminating. The drafters
designed § 2518(8)(a) to decrease the likelihood of tape alteration. NATIONAL WIRETAPPING
COMM'N REP., supra note 12, at 131. If the government tampers with the recordings between
the making of the recording and termination or between termination and return of the tapes to
the court, the defendant perhaps cannot demonstrate this manipulation. Experts agree that a
sophisticated editing process is impossible to detect or only is detectable at a prohibitive ex-
pense. Id. at 89; see People v. Sher, 38 N.Y.2d 600, 345 N.E.2d 314, 381 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1976);
Weiss & Hecker, The Authentication of Magnetic Tapes: Current Problems and Possible Solu-
tions, in NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMM'N REP., supra note 12, at 216, 237. Indeed, no defendant
to-date has proved an allegation of tape tampering. See NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMM'N REP.,
supra note 12, at 131. Thus, when the defendant makes some showing that the tapes are not
accurate, the court can enhance the reliability of the surveillance evidence by requiring the
prosecution to prove the negative proposition that tampering and alteration have not occurred.
In United States v. Wooten, No. 82-1336, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1982), the court stated:
Such alterations moreover, are likely to go undetected because a highly skilled forensic
examiner who is an expert in the fields of tape recording, signal analysis, and speech com-
munication, using the best available analysis equipment, can take weeks and even months
to establish with reasonable certainty the fact that a tape has been falsified. The advan-
tage, in terms of effort, time, and cost is clearly with the forger.
Id. (footnote omitted).
For an outrageous perspective on law enforcement bad faith, see A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST
DEFENSE (1982), whose theme is "Nobody really wants justice." Id. at xxii. Professor Dersho-
witz writes: "[The United States Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York] serves
as a model of integrity. . . .[I]t is essential to disclose the sad reality behind its facade of
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clude dubious tape integrity because the prejudice challenge then
would be equivalent to the challenge based on a lack of tape integ-
rity. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of prejudice ren-
ders the integrity condition surplusage, and although theoretically
more favorable to the defendant than the Third and Eighth Circuit
approach, the Fifth Circuit approach essentially is the same. Thus,
the same problems arise regarding the defendant's sustaining his bur-
den with insufficient resources. To provide the defendant with two
real alternative challenges and to return the burden of proving the
reliability of the tapes to the government, the Fifth Circuit should
deem all delays prejudicial unless the government dispels the infer-
ence that the tapes' integrity is questionable.
The expansive approach of the Seventh Circuit under the Ange-
lini line of cases presents the government two independent theories
by which it can avoid suppression. The first is the statutory satisfac-
tory explanation exception; the second is the Chun test which re-
quires that the defendant prove either (1) that the government dis-
turbed the integrity of the tapes, and (2) that the government
intentionally postponed sealing or gained a tactical advantage from
the delay. This disposition of sealing violations does not accomplish
the articulated legislative purpose of section 2518(8)(a) because it
does not eliminate the opportunity or incentive for tape tampering or
other governmental bad faith. To ensure admissibility of the tapes,
law enforcement officials need only offer a satisfactory explanation
for the delay or comply with the Chun test.
A satisfactory explanation for a delay in sealing of course does
not preclude possible alteration of the tapes during the delay. Re-
quiring proof that the government disturbed the integrity of the
tapes during the sealing delay as a condition precedent to suppres-
sion effects the congressional purpose of ensuring that only those
tapes containing accurate representations of intercepted conversa-
tions are admissible at trial. As with the other circuits' approaches,
however, the burden rests on the defendant to demonstrate question-
able tape integrity, which he probably never can prove because his
limited resources would not detect subtle changes made by sophisti-
cated techniques.
An alternative basis for suppression under Chun is a showing
that the government purposefully postponed sealing the tapes "im-
mediately" and from this delay acquired some tactical advantage.
This alternative, however, similarly prejudices the defendant because
incorruptibility." Id. at 383.
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of his limited resources. The defendant simply cannot obtain infor-
mation regarding prosecutorial strategy and cannot ascertain whether
the government's delay was intentional. To solve the defendant's pre-
dicament, the court should presume that the government altered the
tapes during an intentional postponement of sealing. The court
should require the government-not the defendant-to rebut this
presumption as a precondition to admission of the tapes. Without
this shift of burden, the exceptions for sealing requirement violations
would not effect the congressional purpose underlying the sealing re-
quirement of guaranteeing the integrity of the evidence.
The various circuits, however, are not entirely responsible for ap-
proaches that stray from the enunciated legislative purpose of section
2518(8)(a), for Congress itself enacted a loophole that contradicts the
purported legislative purpose of the statute. The satisfactory expla-
nation exception undermines the deterrent purpose of the statute be-
cause the exception itself does not depend on or encourage govern-
ment measures to ensure preservation of the tapes' integrity during
the sealing delay.
V. CONCLUSION
The rationale offered by Congress for requiring immediate seal-
ing of wiretapping tapes by the court upon the completion of the in-
terception period is to preserve the integrity of the tapes by prevent-
ing any tape tampering, alteration, editing, or other governmental
bad faith. Congress, however, also added an exception to the sealing
requirement that permits disclosure of the tapes' contents in a judi-
cial proceeding if the government has contravened the sealing re-
quirement yet has offered a satisfactory explanation for either a fail-
ure to seal or a delay in sealing. No circuit court treats sealing
requirement violations in a manner that effects the congressional
purpose underlying the sealing requirement. Congress desired to pro-
vide an external safeguard against tampering with or manipulating
recorded evidence. To preserve this safeguard and the integrity of
intercepted communications, courts should interpret section
2518(8)(a) strictly and require a satisfactory explanation for any seal-
ing delay beyond one or two days. Moreover, for purposes of invoking
the exception, the court only should deem an explanation satisfactory
if the cause for the delay during the initial days of the surveillance is
unforeseeable and beyond the government's control. The courts, fur-
thermore, should place an affirmative obligation on the government
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the government pre-
served the integrity of the tapes during the delay. Because the gov-
19831
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ernment initially instituted the electronic surveillance, the court
should shift the burden of proof to the government. If the govern-
ment satisfies these conditions to explain the sealing delay, then the
court should not suppress the tapes for mere technical violation of
the sealing requirement. Alternatively, the court should suppress the
evidence if the government does not satisfy the necessary precondi-
tions explaining the sealing delay.
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